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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(j) (2009).
ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether the district court correctly granted Pollan1 summary judgment
where (I) there is no evidence that Pollan had notice of the alleged temporary
unsafe conditions that caused Lyman to be injured and (II) the dirt road and its
general nature should have been known and obvious to Lyman?
This Court reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment for
correctness, giving no deference to the district court. Jones & Trevor Mktg. v.
Lpwry, 2010 UT App. 113, \ 4, 233 P.3d 538 (citing Raab v. Utah Ry. Co., 2009
UT61,tl0,221P.3d219).
DETERMINATIVE RULE
This case is governed by the following determinative rule:
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)
(c) Motions and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda
and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment
sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be
1

"Pollan" refers collectively to the defendant and appellee Ruthellen Pollan
(deceased) and Mark Solomon, as personal representative of Ms. PoUan's estate.
2

"Lyman" refers to plaintiff and appellant Carla Lyman.
1

rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine
issue as to the amount of damages.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Lyman filed this case against Pollan on September 4, 2007 to recover for
injuries she alleges to have suffered as the result of a fall while walking to Pollan's
residence to begin her shift as a care giver for Pollan. (R. 3-7.) Lyman asserted
one cause of action for negligence. Judge Lyle R. Anderson was assigned as the
presiding Judge.
Pollan filed an answer to the complaint on October 12,2007 denying that
she owed Lyman a duty and denying that she breached any duty. (R. 10-16.)
On October 1, 2009, Pollan filed a motion for summary judgment on the
ground that there were no disputed issues of material fact and that she was entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. On November 30, 2009, Judge Anderson
commenced a hearing on the motion. Despite the hearing having been properly
noticed, neither Lyman nor her counsel appeared for the hearing. (R. 384, 396.)
After hearing oral argument from Pollan's counsel, the Court granted the motion.
(R. 384, 396.)
Lyman filed a notice of appeal from Judge Anderson's summary judgment
on December 21, 2009.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For purposes of this appeal, Pollan sets out below the material undisputed
2

facts presented to the district court. As was true in Pollan's motion for summary
judgment to the district court, by setting forth the facts below, Pollan does not
waive (and hereby reserves) the right to present evidence in any future proceeding
that may support or refute the facts presented herein.
Lyman Provided Care To Pollan At Pollan's Home, Which Is Adjacent
To An Unpaved, Unimproved Dirt And Gravel Road
As of May 21, 2004, Pollan was homebound suffering from a terminal
condition which required around-the-clock care. (R. 4, % 6; R. 248,12; R. 266,
34:12-20.) Lyman worked as one of Pollan's in-home caregivers from July 2003
through May 2004. (R. 248, f 5; R. 273, 66:3-13).
Pollan's home was located north of Blanding, Utah in rural San Juan
County. (R. 248,13; 268, 45:2-23.) Pollan's home was adjacent to an unpaved,
unimproved dirt and gravel road, which Lyman describes, in part, as "just a dirt
road" (the "Dirt Road").3 (R. 248,fflf3-4; R. 267, 44:15-21; R. 268, 48:15-19; R.

As Pollan pointed out in her reply memorandum in support of her motion for
summary judgment, there is no specific evidence in the record to show that Pollan
owned or possessed the Dirt Road. (R. 361.) However, Pollan admitted that she
owned the "subject premises" in response to Request No. 5 of Lyman's first set of
requests for admission (R. 194) and indicated that there was no dispute that Pollan
owned the "premises" in response to Lyman's statement of undisputed fact in a
previous motion for summary judgment (not the motion currently before the
Court). (R 175, f 4.) Consequently, Pollan does not argue on appeal that Pollan
did not own the Dirt Road because there may arguably remain ambiguity about the
terms "premises" and "subject premises".
3

213-144.) The Dirt Road5 runs north and south in front of Pollan's home. (R. 268,
46:9-11.) A cement pathway runs east and west from the Dirt Road to Pollan's
house. (R. 268, 45:6-11; R. 270, 53:23-54:14.) And a yard lamp sits on Pollan's
property where the cement pathway meets the Dirt Road. (R. 267, 43:22-25; R.
213-14.) The Dirt Road is not illuminated by street lights and there are no
sidewalks or neighbors immediately adjacent to Pollan's home. (R. 248,13; R.
268,45:6-20.)
The Dirt Road's surface is uneven and made up of gravel, rocks, and dirt.
(R. 248, f 4; R. 267, 44:10-19; R. 268, 48:5-19; R. 271, 57:11-13.) Moreover, the
Dirt Road was not paved or formally landscaped in any fashion and, in particular,
the Dirt Road was not formally landscaped or paved with cobblestones. (See R.
267, 44:15-19; R. 268, 48:8-19; R. 270, 55:13-56:14.)
Although during her deposition Lyman used the term "landscaped" once and
4

The photographs contained in the record at pages 213 and 214 purportedly depict
the Dirt Road, the yard lamp in Pollan's yard, and the cement pathway that leads
from the Dirt Road to Pollan's front door. Although the photos were not cited in
the summary judgment motions from which Lyman appeals, and although no
foundation was laid for the photographs, they are, nevertheless, contained in the
record and are referenced to aid the Court's general understanding.
5

Lyman refers to the Dirt Road as a "driveway." However, the Dirt Road and
what Lyman refers to as a driveway are one and the same. (See R. 270, 53:1354:14 (providing that Lyman would walk along the driveway to access the cement
walkway that lead to Pollan's front door); R. 267, 43:22-25, 44:10-25 (providing
that the yard light was located at the point where the sidewalk intersected the
driveway and that the driveway is the dirt and gravel road that runs in front of
Pollan's home).
4

also made some reference to "cobblestones (including cobblestones that were used
to decorate Pollan's yard and to make a pathway) (R. 268, 48:13, 11-19; R. 269,
52:12-R.270, 53:2; R. 270, 55:13-56:14; R. 269, 52:12-25), she explained, relative
to the Dirt Road (as opposed to other areas of Pollan's property), that the
"cobblestones" she referred to are natural river rocks of different shapes and sizes
that were under the gravel and under the road base of the Dirt Road. (R. 268,
48:13, 11-19; R. 269, 52:12-R.270, 53:2; R. 270, 55:13-56:14.) Moreover, read in
the context of her entire deposition testimony, her use of the term cobblestones as
underlying road base for the Dirt Road was not an indication that the Dirt Road,
where Lyman's fall occurred (as opposed to the pathway) was formally landscaped
or paved with cobblestone. (See R. 269, 52:4-R. 270, 53:12; R. 270, 55:9-R. 271,
57:10.) Specifically, with regard to the Dirt Road, Lyman testified as follows:
Q.

Where did you normally park if you had the choice? Where did
you like to park?

A.

Just right in that same area. I stopped driving up her gravel
driveway because of the noise, and it was all dirt and rocks
anyway.

Q.

So would you—but the street in front of her home, was it
paved?

A.

No.

Q.

Dirt road?

A.

A dirt and gravel road.
5

Q.

So would you park on the dirt road?

A.

Uh-huh. Yes.

Q.

You were walking up the driveway, the gravel driveway?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you said it's made out of—it's got gravel on it?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What about the cobblestones, what's that about?

A.

Well, that's how she landscaped a lot of it.

Q.

So was it a cobblestone driveway with gravel on top?

A.

It was like roadbase [sic], gravel mixed together. It was—if
you don't live in the country—it was just a dirt road.

(R. 267, 44:10-21, 268, 48:5-19.)
Given the unimproved nature of the Dirt Road, Lyman occasionally
encountered water, slush, and mud on the Dirt Road when arriving for her shift at
Pollan's home. (See R. 248, f 5; R. 273, 66:6-67:3.)
Lyman Falls While Walking Along the Dirt Road
On May 21, 2004, Lyman arrived at the Dirt Road at about 9:00 or 10:00
p.m. to begin work at Pollan's home. (R. 247,11; R. 248, If 7; R. 265, 32:14-15;
R. 268, 45:25-46:12.) That night, Lyman parked her car in the same area as she
did several times a week when arriving for her shift. (R. 248,16; R. 270, 54:15-

55:3.) The yard light ~ which had been illuminated the night before ~ was not
illuminated. (R. 249,ffif9-10; R. 267,43:8-44:5; R. 271, 59:17-19; R. 213-14.)
As she typically did upon her arrival, Lyman began walking up the Dirt
Road toward the cement pathway that led to Pollan's home. (R. 249,111; R. 268,
47:24-48:7; R. 270, 53:20-54:18.) Lyman was looking toward Pollan's home as
she walked and was not looking at the ground. (R. 249, f 12; R. 271, 59:3-11; R.
271, 59:17-60:2.) As Lyman walked up the Dirt Road, her right foot stepped into
what she describes as an indention6 in the Dirt Road and her left foot slid on the
gravel. (R249, H 13; R. 268, 48:21-22; R. 269, 51:3-22,; R. 270, 55:9-56:9.) Due
to Lyman's right foot stepping into the indention and her left foot sliding on the
gravel surface of the Dirt Road, Lyman sustained injuries to her right ankle and left
foot. (R. 249, U 14; R. 269, 51:7-22; R. 272, 62:3-15.)
Although Lyman surmises that she stepped into an indention, Lyman never
looked (either before or after her fall) to see what actually caused her to fall and
she admittedly cannot specifically describe the condition that caused her fall. (R.
250, f 16; R. 272, 64:13-19; R. 273, 65:2-4; R. 269,49:13-50:7; R. 271, 57:18-25.)
Lyman also did not notice the indention prior to her fall, does not know if anyone
else knew about the indention, and does know how or when the indention was
6

Although Lyman suggests on appeal that she fell in a "hole" (Br. of Appellant, p.
viii), Lyman's own deposition testimony establishes that the condition she believed
caused her fall was not a "hole" but an "indention". (See R. 345-48; R. 268,
47:24-48:22; R. 269, 51:20-52:21; R. 270, 55:9-56:14.)
7

created in the Dirt Road. (Id; R. 271, 57:18-58:2; R. 268-69, 48:21-49:10;
compare R. 250, f 17 with R. 288-91 (showing that Lyman does not dispute
paragraph 17 of Pollan's statement of undisputed fact, which stated that "Plaintiff
does not know how or when the rock became dislodged, and did not notice the
indention prior to her fall, and does not know if anyone else knew about the
indention.")
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Court should affirm the district court's summary judgment in Pollan's
favor because there is no evidence that Pollan had notice of the temporary unsafe
conditions alleged to have caused Lyman's injuries (an indention in the Dirt Road
and the unlighted yard light). Accordingly, as a matter of law, liability for
Lyman's injuries cannot attach to Pollan.
Under Utah law, whether and when liability attaches in a slip and fall case
depends upon the nature of the unsafe condition alleged to have caused the injury.
Utah law recognizes two classes of unsafe conditions - those of a temporary nature
and those of a permanent nature. Here, the alleged unsafe conditions that injured
Lyman (the unlighted yard light and indention in the Dirt Road) are temporary
conditions because Pollan did not create either condition.
Thus, in order to attach liability to Pollan, Utah law requires that Lyman
provide evidence that Pollan had constructive or actual knowledge of the unsafe
8

conditions and a reasonable amount of time to remedy them. However, there is no
evidence in the record of this case that Pollan had knowledge of either condition,
let alone a reasonable opportunity to remedy them. As such, reasonable persons
could only conclude that Pollan lacked knowledge of the alleged unsafe conditions.
Consequently, as a matter of law, Lyman cannot establish an essential element of
her claim and the district court was correct to summarily dispose of it without a
jury trial.
Alternatively, even if the Dirt Road is deemed a permanent hazardous
condition, summary judgment is still warranted. This is because Pollan owed no
duty to warn Lyman of the genaral condition of the Dirt Road (including the
possibility of the purported indention, the Dirt Road's composition, and its
unevenness) where it should have been obvious and known to Lyman given the
frequency with which Lyman traversed the Dirt Road and because the unevenness
and dirt and gravel composition was inherent to the nature of the Dirt Road. Under
Utah law, a landowner is not obligated to warn invitees of conditions on the land
whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate
the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness. Here, this Court should hold that
Pollan had no duty to warn Lyman about the condition of the Dirt Road and the
possible dangers of traversing the Dirt Road at night because the uneven, gravel
and dirt composition of the Dirt Road was known and obvious to Lyman and was
9

also inherent in the very nature of the Dirt Road. For this reason, summary
n

judgment in Pollan's favor is also warranted.
ARGUMENT

I.

AS A MATTER OF LAW, LIABILITY FOR LYMAN'S INJURIES
CANNOT ATTACH TO POLLAN BECAUSE POLLAN HAD NO
NOTICE OF THE TEMPORARY CONDITIONS ALLEGED TO
HAVE CAUSED LYMAN'S INJURIES
The material facts in this case are undisputed such that reasonable minds

could only reach one conclusion based upon them: Pollan did not have notice of
the alleged temporary unsafe conditions (the indention in the Dirt Road and the
unlighted yard light). Consequently, as a matter of law, liability for Lyman's
injuries cannot attach to Pollan. Accordingly, the district court correctly granted
summary judgment in Pollan's favor.
Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

In addition to these two arguments, Pollan argued to the trial court that summary
judgment was proper because there was no special relationship between Pollan and
Lyman. Given the brevity of the district court's ruling, it is unclear which
argument below the district court found most persuasive. However, Pollan does
not assert the special relationship argument on appeal. Pollan has since determined
and recognizes that a special relationship likely exists between owners and invitees
and that Lyman was likely Pollan's invitee. See Webb v. Univ. of Utah, 2005 UT
80,1f 10, 125 P.3d 906 (noting that the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A
describes landowner and invitees as examples of special relationships);
Restatement (Second) Torts, § 332 cmt. j (noting that a domestic servants is a
business visitor). Nevertheless, summary judgment was correctly granted in this
case on the grounds argued herein on appeal.
10

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). A party moving for summary judgment on an issue which
the nonmoving party carries the burden proof at trial satisfies its burden by
showing "that there is no genuine issue of material fact." Orvis v. Johnson. 2002
UT 2, f 18, 177 P.3d 600. Once the movant shows that no genuine dispute of fact
exists, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party who cannot "rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Specific to this case, well-established premises liability case law in Utah
holds that summary judgment without a jury is appropriate in those cases where a
plaintiff has failed to meet the minimum requirement necessary to sustain her
action. See, e.g., Goebel v. Salt Lake City S. R.R. Co., 2004 UT 80, 104 P.3d
1185; Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1996). Thus,
"where the evidence is free from doubt so that all reasonable [persons] would come
to the same conclusion, summary disposition is appropriate." Schnuphase, 918
P.2d at 477 (quoting Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170,172 (Utah 1983)) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). In other words, "bare
contentions, unsupported by any specification of facts in support thereof, raise no
material questions of fact as will preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id.
(quoting Massev v. Utah Power & Light, 609 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1980)) (internal
11

quotation marks omitted).
In this case, the material facts are free from doubt such that reasonable
minds would come to the same conclusion that liability for Lyman's injuries
cannot, as a matter of law, attach to Pollan. This is because (A) the alleged unsafe
conditions (the indention in the Dirt Road and the unlighted yard light) that caused
Lyman's injuries are temporary unsafe conditions; (B) it is undisputed that Pollan
had no notice (actual or constructive) of the alleged temporary unsafe conditions,
which is required by Utah law before liability can attach; and (C) Lyman has failed
to present specific genuine issues of material fact worthy of trial.
A.

The Unlighted Yard Light and Indention in the Dirt Road Were
Temporary Conditions.

Lyman's claim against Pollan arises from injuries Lyman purportedly
suffered as result of an indention in the Dirt Road and an unlighted yard light. This
Court should conclude that under Utah law, both the indention and the unlighted
yard light are temporary unsafe conditions.
In Utah, "property owners are not insurers of the safety of those who come
upon their property, even business invitees." Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565
P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1977). "Rather, whether and when liability attaches
depends upon the nature of the unsafe condition that caused the injury." Johnson
v. Gold's Gym, 2009 UT App. 76, f 15, 206 P.3d 302. Utah law provides "two
classes of unsafe conditions that may result in liability" in slip and fall cases. Id. at
12

1 16; see Merino v. Albertsons, Inc., 1999 UT 14,14, 975 P.2d 467. The first
class "involves some unsafe condition of a temporary nature" and the second class
"involves some unsafe condition of a permanent nature." Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at
478; see also Jex v. JRA, Inc., 2008 UT 67,ffi[11-29, 196 P.3d 576; Goebel, 2004
UT 80, at 119.
Temporary unsafe conditions are generally unsafe conditions that were not
created by the land owner. See Goebel, 2004 UT 80, at 1f 20; Gold's Gym, 2009
UT App 76, at Iffl 18-19. For example, in Goebel the Utah Supreme Court held that
a gap between panels at a railroad crossing was a temporary condition. 2004 UT
80, at H 20-21. The Court reasoned that because the "defendant did not create the
unsafe condition, and is 'responsible' for it only in the context of maintenance, not
for its existence in the first place," the gap was a temporary hazardous condition.

14
Likewise, in Gold's Gym, a crack in the asphalt of a parking lot was held to
be a temporary hazardous condition. 2009 UT App 76, at If 20. The Court based
its holding on the fact the defendant did not create the crack in the asphalt and, as
in Goebel, was only responsible for the lot's maintenance. Id. Accordingly, the
Court held that the crack was properly classified as a temporary hazardous
condition. Id.

13

And, in Fischbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, the Supreme Court of Utah
applied the temporary hazardous condition rule to unlighted street lights and
affirmed summary judgment in the defendants5 favor because there was no
evidence that the defendants had notice of the unlighted street lights or a
reasonable opportunity to fix the unlighted lights. 969 P.2d 403, 407-08.
On the other hand, permanent unsafe conditions are conditions of a
permanent nature, such as "in the structure of a building or of a stairway, or in
equipment or machinery, or in the manner of use, which was created or chosen by
the defendant (or his agents), or for which he is responsible." GoebeL 2004 UT 80,
at Tf 19 (quoting Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 478). The foreseeability and the inherent
danger of a created condition are key elements under the permanent condition
theory of liability. Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 479. Relevant to this case, in Hone v.
ZZXYZ Management Group, L.L.C, this Court held that landscaping was not a
permanent unsafe condition. No. 20030099, 2004 Utah App LEXIS 174, ** 3-4
(Utah Ct. App. March 11, 2004) (unpublished). In so holding, the Court noted that
for landscaping to be a permanent hazardous condition, it would have to be
anticipated that the unsafe condition would occur "in the absence of an intervening
act" and also noted that "landscaping is not a method of operation." Id.
Here, the alleged unsafe conditions (the indention in the Dirt Road and the
unlighted yard light) are temporary conditions. There is no evidence in the record
14

to establish that Pollan created either the indention or the unlighted condition of the
yard light or that the Dirt Road or the yard light are inherently dangerous, a key
element of a permanent unsafe condition. See Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 479.
Rather, as in Goebel and Gold's Gym, the best that can be said is that Pollan was
responsible for the maintenance of the yard light and the Dirt Road (though there is
no evidence establishing those facts), which is wholly insufficient to cause either
the Dirt Road or the yard light to fall into the class of permanent unsafe conditions.
See Goebel 2004 UT 80, at f 20; Gold's Gym, 2009 UT App 76, at f 20.
Moreover, the fact that Lyman had never observed the alleged unsafe
condition in the Dirt Road either before or after her fall and the fact that the yard
light was illuminated on previous nights (including the night before) further
demonstrates the temporary nature of those conditions. (See R. 268, 48:21-R. 269,
49:10; R. 269, 49:13-50:7; R. 271, 57:18-58:2; R. 272, 64:13-19; R. 273, 65:2-4;
R. 267, 43:8-44; R. 271, 59:17-19.) Indeed, the indention in the Dirt Road and the
unlighted yard light are analogous to the gap between panels in Goebel, the asphalt
crack in Gold's Gym, and the unlighted street lights in Fishbaugh, each of which
was a temporary hazardous condition.
Nevertheless, Lyman argues that the Dirt Road "as-landscaped presented a
permanent unsafe condition, due to the nature of the rocks that compose the
driveway." (Br. of Appellant, at p. 4.) That argument is unpersuasive because
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Lyman fails to point to evidence or facts sufficient to create a genuine issue for
trial as to whether the Dirt Road was created by Pollan, is inherently dangerous, or
that the condition alleged to have caused Lyman to fall was created by Pollan or
otherwise permanent in nature.
Moreover, to the extent Lyman is contending that the Dirt Road was
landscaped and such landscaping constitutes a permanent unsafe condition, that
contention is unavailing. First, landscaping is not typically a permanent unsafe
condition. See Hone, 2004 Utah App LEXIS 174, ** 3-4. Second, the Dirt Road
was not formally landscaped.
As a practical matter, any view of the Dirt Road would immediately prove
this fact. (R. 213-14 (see footnote 4, supra).) As Lyman in part described in her
deposition, "[i]t was like roadbase [sic], gravel mixed together. It was - if you
don't live in the country - it was just a dirt road." (R. 268, 48:17-19.) Although
Lyman used the term "landscaped" once in her deposition and also made some
reference in her deposition to "cobblestones", she explained, relative to the Dirt
Road (as opposed to other areas of Pollan's property), that the "cobblestones" she
referred to are natural river rocks of different shapes and sizes that were under the
gravel and under the road base of the Dirt Road.8 (R. 268, 48:11-19, 270, 55:13-

o

In her deposition, Lyman referred to cobblestones that Pollan used for decoration
to make a pathway. (R. 269, 52:12-25.) However, read in the context of her entire
deposition testimony, use of the term cobblestones as underlying road base for the
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56:14.) The following colloquy shows that the Dirt Road was just that - an
unpaved dirt road and not one that was formally landscaped by having been
adorned, improved, arranged, or paved with cobblestone or in some other manner:
Q.

Where did you normally park if you had the choice? Where did
you like to park?

A.

Just right in that same area. I stopped driving up her gravel
driveway because of the noise, and it was all dirt and rocks
anyway.

Q.

So would you—but the street in front of her home, was it
paved?

A.

No.

Q.

Dirt road?

A.

A dirt and gravel road.

Q.

So would you park on the dirt road?

A.

Uh-huh. Yes.

Q.

You were walking up the driveway, the gravel driveway?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you said it's made out of—it's got gravel on it?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What about the cobblestones, what's that about?

Dirt Road was not an indication that the Dirt Road, where Lyman's fall occurred
(as opposed to the pathway), was formally landscaped or paved with cobblestone.
(See R. 269, 52:4-R. 270, 53:12; R. 270, 55:9-R. 271, 57:10.)
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A.

Well, that's how she landscaped a lot of it.

Q.

So was it a cobblestone driveway with gravel on top?

A.

It was like roadbase [sic], gravel mixed together. It was—if
you don't live in the country—it was just a dirt road.

(R. 267, 44:10-21, 268,48:5-19 (emphasis added).)
In addition, Lyman's speculation as to how the indention was formed
confirms that the Dirt Road was just a dirt road. According to Lyman, "every time
somebody turns around on a gravel road, depending upon how fast it shifts, how
fast they are going" indentions are created in the gravel road, which she believed
may have happened in this case. (R. 268,48:24-R. 269:10; R. 271, 57:18-58:2.)
Thus, contrary to Lyman's contention, a reasonable person could not
conclude that the Dirt Road was a permanent hazardous condition because there is
no evidence in the record by way of affidavit or otherwise that demonstrates that
Pollan created the condition of the Dirt Road; was responsible for the condition or
maintenance of the Dirt Road; that the Dirt Road was inherently dangerous; or,
even assuming for the sake of argument that the Dirt Road was formally
landscaped, that it was Pollan who landscaped it. The bottom line is that alleged
indention in the Dirt Road that caused Lyman to fall was a temporary condition
and Lyman's contrary argument lacks merit.
In sum, the Dirt Road and the unlighted yard light were temporary unsafe
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conditions. Accordingly, if Lyman is to prevail against Pollan, she can only do so
under a temporary unsafe condition theory. But as discussed in Part B below,
because the undisputed facts establish that Pollan had no knowledge of the
indention or the unlighted yard light, as a matter of law, Lyman cannot prevail on a
temporary unsafe condition theory.
B.

Lyman Cannot Sustain Her Premises Liability Claim Against
Pollan Because There is no Evidence that Pollan had Notice of the
Alleged Temporary Unsafe Conditions.

Because there is no genuine dispute worthy of trial as to the fact that Pollan
did not have knowledge of the unlighted yard light or the indention in the Dirt
Road, the district court correctly granted summary judgment in Pollan's favor.
Utah law requires evidence of "actual or constructive notice of a temporary
unsafe condition for liability to attach." Goebel, 2004 UT 80, at 119; see Gold's
Gym, 2009 UT App 76, at f 20. Thus, under Utah law, "[i]t is quite universally
held that fault cannot be imputed to the defendant so that liability results therefrom
unless two conditions are met: (A) that [the defendant] had knowledge of the
condition, that is, either actual knowledge or constructive knowledge because the
condition had existed long enough that [the defendant] should have discovered it;
and (B) that after such knowledge, sufficient time elapsed that in the exercise of
reasonable care [the defendant] should have remedied it." Goebel, 2004 UT 80, f
19; see also Jex, 2008 UT 67, at If 16; Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 478; Allen v.
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Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975). As a variant to this
rule, if the temporary unsafe condition was created by the defendant, the notice
requirement does not apply. Jex, 2008 UT 67, at ^f 16.
Accordingly, "evidence of notice and a reasonable time to remedy are
required to survive a motion for summary judgment" in cases such as this where
the claim is based upon a defendant's alleged failure to remedy a dangerous
condition the defendant did not create. Goebel, 2004 UT 80, at f 22. Indeed,
"because notice is a fundamental component of the negligence equation," id. at f
17, to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must provide specific evidence of
when the defendant had actual or constructive notice of the defect, because without
such evidence the plaintiff cannot prove that the defendant failed to repair the
unsafe condition within a reasonable time after receiving notice of it. See
Fishbaugh, 969 P.2d at 408.
A person is deemed to have received constructive notice of a fact only if he
"could have discovered the fact by proper diligence, and his situation was such as
to cast upon him the duty of inquiring into it." Gold's Gym, 2009 UT App 76, at f
21. In the context of temporary unsafe conditions, constructive notice is imputed
to a defendant "when there is some evidence of the length of time" the unsafe
condition has existed and that evidence "would show . . . that it had been there for
an appreciable time." Jex, 2008 UT 67 at 119 (quoting Ohlson v. Safeway Stores,
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Inc., 568 P.2d 753, 754 (Utah 1977) (internal quotations marks omitted) (alteration
in the original). Accordingly, Utah law does not "impute[] constructive notice in
cases . . . where there is no evidence regarding the amount of time the unsafe
condition has existed." Id.
Applying the foregoing rules, Utah courts grant judgment as a matter of law
on negligent claims based upon temporary unsafe conditions where it is undisputed
that the defendant had no notice of the condition, where there is no evidence that
the defendant had notice of the unsafe condition, or where there is no evidence as
to how long the alleged hazardous condition has existed.
For example, in Fishbaugh, the Utah Supreme Court held the plaintiffs
failure to present evidence that the defendant had notice and an opportunity to
remedy the alleged unsafe temporary condition of unlighted street lights was fatal
to the plaintiffs case. 969 P.2d at 408. There, the plaintiff was hit by a car while
crossing a street at night. Id. at 404. At the time of the accident, twenty-eight
street lights that usually lit the street plaintiff crossed were out. IdL Consequently,
the plaintiff sued the power company and the city for failing to maintain the street
lights. Id. at 403-04. The Supreme Court of Utah affirmed summary judgment in
the defendants' favor on the ground that there was no evidence that the defendants
had notice of the outage or a reasonable opportunity to remedy the outage before
the accident occurred. Id at 407-08. As such, as a matter of law, the plaintiff could
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not prove that the defendants had negligently maintained the street lights. Id. at
408.
Similarly, the Court in Goebel affirmed a directed verdict in the defendant's
favor where no reasonable jury could have found that the defendant had notice of a
gap between railroad field panels, which was alleged to have caused the plaintiff to
crash while riding his bicycle. 2004 UT 80, atfflj21-25, 41. The Court found that
there was "no evidence of notice, let alone evidence of how long [the defendant]
may have had [] notice" of the condition. Id. at f 21.
Likewise, in Gold's Gym, this Court affirmed summary judgment in the
defendants' favor on the ground that it was undisputed that the defendants did not
have knowledge of a crack in asphalt that had developed on the defendants'
parking lot, which plaintiff alleged caused her to trip and fall and injure herself.
2009 UT App 76, at % 26. In that case, the undisputed facts established that the
defendants did not have knowledge of the crack. Id at ^ff 21-26. Accordingly, the
Court held that summary judgment was correctly granted because the plaintiff
"presented no genuine dispute of material fact on the existence of a duty breached"
by the defendants. Id. at ^ 27.
And, finally, in Malonev v. Salt Lake City, 262 P.2d 281 (Utah 1953), the
Utah Supreme Court upheld summary judgment in the defendant's favor where
there was no evidence of an unsafe condition in a sidewalk prior to the plaintiff
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falling while walking along it. Id at 282. Plaintiff alleged that the sidewalk had
been cracked and slightly sunken prior to the accident and that the defendant was
negligent in maintaining it. Id. at 281. However, the plaintiff could not "state that
the sidewalk was in a defective condition before the accident, although he had
previously used the sidewalk in question many times" and there was no other
evidence that an unsafe condition existed prior to the accident. Id. at 282.
Consequently, with no evidence that the alleged unsafe condition existed before
the accident, there "was no evidence that an actionable defect existed before the
accident took place" such that the trial court did not err in directing a verdict in
favor of the defendants. Id. 9
Applying the foregoing rules here, summary judgment in Pollan's favor is
appropriate because Lyman has failed to present evidence sufficient to create a
genuine dispute of material fact worthy of trial as to whether Pollan had knowledge
9

See also, e.g.- Merino, 1999 UT 14 (holding that trial court erred in not granting
directed verdict where there was no evidence that defendant had knowledge of the
temporary unsafe condition to have injured plaintiff); Schnuphase, 918 P.2d 476
(affirming summary judgment where it was undisputed that defendant had no
knowledge of temporary unsafe condition alleged to have injured an invitee);
Martin, 565 P.2d 1139 (affirming trial court's directed verdict in defendant's favor
because there was no evidence as to how long the temporary condition alleged to
have injured plaintiff had existed); Krevling v. St. George City, No. 20070882,
2008 Utah App. LEXIS 359 (Utah Ct. App. Oct. 17,2008) (unpublished)
(affirming summary judgment in defendant's favor in absence of evidence of how
long hole on city parking strip had existed); Babbitt v. 7-Eleven Sales Corp., No.
981755, 2000 Utah App. LEXIS 325 (Utah Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2000) (unpublished)
(affirming summary judgment because there was no evidence that defendant had
knowledge of temporary unsafe conditions alleged to have caused plaintiff injury).
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of the indention and the yard light. In fact, the material undisputed facts establish
that there is no evidence that Pollan had knowledge of the conditions prior to
Lyman's fall - let alone for a sufficiently reasonable time in which to remedy the
conditions.
Relative to the purported indention in the Dirt Road, the material undisputed
facts are (1) that Lyman, despite having walked along the Dirt Road numerous
times to go to work, did not know when the indention was created, had never
observed the indention before or after her fall, and is unaware of any other person
who was aware of or knew anything about the indention, (R. 268-69, 48:21-49:12;
R. 270, 54:15-55:3; R. 271, 57:18-58:2; compare R. 250, f 17 wWi R. 288
(showing that Lyman does not dispute paragraph 17 of Pollan5 s statement of
undisputed fact, which stated that "Plaintiff does not know how or when the rock
became dislodged, and did not notice the indention prior to her fall, and does not
know if anyone else knew about the indention.")); (2) Lyman cannot describe
exactly what caused her to fall, (R. 269, 49:3-4.); and (3) Pollan was terminally-ill
and bedridden at the time and was dependent upon a round-the-clock personal
caregivers (R. 4-5,^f 6; R. 34:12-20). There is no evidence in the record that Pollan
(or any employee or agent) knew or should have known of the indention or had any
obligation to maintain or inspect the Dirt Road.10 There is also no evidence of

As Lyman points out, Pollan employed a maintenance person to make repairs
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whether the alleged indention existed before Lyman's fall, or, alternatively, how
long it existed before the fall.
Thus, because there is no evidence that Pollan had knowledge of the
indention and there is no evidence as to whether or for how long the indention
existed before Lyman's fall, reasonable persons could only conclude that Pollan
did not have notice of the indention. Accordingly, as in Goebel, Fishbaugh, Gold's
Gym, and Maloney (among numerous other Utah cases), Lyman's claim fails as a
matter of law.
The same is true with regard to the unlighted yard light. The undisputed
material facts are that (1) the yard light had been illuminated on previous nights,
including the night before Lyman's fall, (R. 267, 43:15-44:5); (2) the yard light
was not illuminated on the night of Lyman's fall, (R. 267, 43:4-18.); and (3)
Lyman arrived at Pollan's home around 9:00 or 10:00 p.m. on May 21, the night of
her fall. (R. 247, f 1; R. 248, f 7; R. 265, 32:14-15; R. 268, 45:25-46:13.) There
is no evidence sufficient to show that Pollan (or any employee or agent) knew or

around her house. (Br. of Appellant, p. x.) But there is no evidence as to whether
part of the maintenance person's job was to inspect or maintain the yard light
and/or the Dirt Road. Moreover, even assuming that his job was to inspect and
maintain the yard light and the Dirt Road, there is no evidence in the record that he
had knowledge of the indention or the unlighted yard light or had reasonable time
to remedy the conditions. Consequently, the fact that Pollan employed a person to
perform repairs around her home has no bearing upon the conclusion that Pollan
did not have notice of the alleged temporary unsafe conditions.
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should have known about the unlighted yard light.11 Moreover, there is no
evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Pollan had constructive
knowledge of the unlighted yard light.
According to the undisputed facts, the yard light was illuminated the last
time it was dark (the night before) and was not illuminated when Lyman arrived at
Pollan's home at about 9:00 p.m., not long after sunset the night of her fall. As
such, it cannot be disputed that there was little, if any, time for Pollan (especially
given her terminally-ill and bedridden condition) to have observed and remedied
the unlighted yard lamp before Lyman's fall. In the absence of any evidence to
show that Pollan had knowledge of the unlighted yard lamp or that it had been
unlighted for a sufficiently reasonable amount of time, as the defendants in
Fishbaugh, Pollan is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
In short, where there is no evidence and no dispute worthy of trial as to
whether Pollan knew of the alleged unsafe temporary conditions, there is no
genuine dispute of material fact as to the existence of a duty breached by Pollan
and the district court correctly granted judgment as a matter of law in Pollan's
favor. As Utah courts consistently recognize, "[n]ot every accident that occurs
gives rise to a cause of action upon which a party may recover damages from
someone." Martin, 565 P.2d at 1142. Such is the case here.

11

See footnote 10, supra.
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C.

Lyman's Arguments Fail to Alter the Conclusion that Summary
Judgment is Appropriate.

Lyman attempts to avoid the conclusion that summary judgment is
warranted in this case by essentially arguing that there are genuine issues of fact
for trial as to (1) whether Pollan breached an elevated duty of care she owed to
Lyman as a business invitee and (2) whether Pollan assumed and breached an
elevated duty of care by landscaping the Dirt Road. (Br. of Appellant, at pp. 2-7.)
Both arguments fail to provide the Court with any legitimate reason to alter the
conclusion that Pollan is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because she had no
notice of the indention or the unlighted yard light.
First, Lyman argues that she was a business invitee of Pollan's, which
imposed an elevated duty of care upon Pollan. (Id at pp. 3-7.) Consequently,
Lyman argues that the duty of care contained in the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
§ 343 as discussed in Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT 24, 116 P.3d 263 applies and
that Pollan breached that duty by failing to assure that her yard light was
functioning and because the Dirt Road was a permanent unsafe condition. (Id. at p.
4.) This argument is unpersuasive.
Even assuming that Lyman was a business invitee while walking on the Dirt
Road, the fact that Pollan owed Lyman the duty set forth in Section 343 of the
Restatement is irrelevant because Pollan had no notice of the temporary unsafe
conditions such that liability for Lyman's injuries cannot attach to Pollan. As
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discussed above, Utah law requires evidence of "actual or constructive notice [of a
temporary unsafe condition] for liability to attach." Goebel 2004 UT 80, at f 19;
see Gold's Gym, 2009 UT App 76, at f20. Here, the material undisputed facts
show that Pollan did not have knowledge of the alleged unsafe conditions. As
such, liability cannot attach, regardless of the nature of the duty Pollan may have
owed Lyman as an invitee under Section 343 of the Restatement.
To be sure, in Gold's Gym, this Court rejected a similar argument by the
plaintiff in that case. There, the plaintiff cited to Section 343 and Hale (as Lyman
does) to argue that Section 343 (and not the temporary unsafe condition rule
contained in Goebel) applied to her claims that she suffered injury by tripping on a
crack in asphalt because she was a business invitee. Gold's Gym, 2009 UT App
76, at f 20 n.8. In rejecting the plaintiffs argument, the Gold's Gym court
observed that Hale and Section 343 of the Restatement "discuss the landowner's
duty, not when a duty arises." Id. The court further observed that, under Utah law,
"it is the nature of the unsafe condition, rather than the status of the injured
plaintiff, that determines when liability attaches." Id. Here, as in Gold's Gym,
liability does not attach where the nature of the condition is temporary and the
defendant did not have knowledge of the condition, regardless of the plaintiffs
status as an invitee. See id. atffif26-27. Accordingly, similar to the plaintiffs
argument in Gold's Gym, Lyman's argument that Section 343 applies to this case
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does not alter the conclusion that liability cannot attach to Pollan because Pollan
did not have notice of the temporary unsafe conditions. Therefore, Lyman's
argument should be rejected.
Lyman's second argument fairs no better. Lyman also argues that Pollan
assumed an elevated duty of care because she landscaped the Dirt Road.12 Lyman
basis her argument, in part, on Conrad v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 542 P.2d 1090
(Utah 1975), which held that by undertaking the task of keeping a sidewalk level
the defendant undertook the duty to keep it level in a non-negligent manner. Id at
1090. Conrad is inapposite, however, because, as discussed in Part I A above,
Pollan did not formally landscape the Dirt Road and there is no evidence that
Pollan created the Dirt Road. Indeed, there is no evidence that shows or creates a
genuine question as to whether Pollan formally landscaped the Dirt Road, as that
term may be used to infer that Pollan improved the road in some manner which
caused it to be something other than a typical dirt road made of dirt and gravel. As
outlined more fully above, in Lyman's own words the Dirt Road was "just a dirt
road" and any observation of it would immediately dispose of any indication that it

12

Lyman pointed out to the district court that Pollan had landscaped other areas of
her property. (See R. 293.) To the extent Lyman contends on appeal that
landscaping in other areas of Pollan's land imposed some duty upon her relative to
the Dirt Road, that argument is without merit. Certainly, undertaking to landscape
one portion of a person's property should not impose upon them some elevated
duty with regard to other areas of the property which the landowner has not
undertaken to improve or formally landscape.
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is otherwise. (See Part I A supra) Consequently, the duty discussed in Conrad to
perform a task undertaken in a non-negligent manner is inapplicable in this case
because there is no evidence that Pollan undertook to formally landscape the Dirt
Road.
Furthermore, even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Pollan
formally landscaped the Dirt Road with cobblestones, Lyman has not presented
specific facts sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for trial as to
whether Pollan landscaped the Dirt Road negligently. In fact, there is no evidence
that demonstrates exactly what the condition was that caused Lyman to fall, let
alone whether that condition was the result of some negligent formal landscaping
by Pollan. The evidence is that Lyman never saw the condition that caused her to
fall (either before or after her fall) despite having traversed the Dirt Road
numerous times and Lyman's theory that the condition was an indention that may
have been caused by a rock being dislodged by a car at some time. (See R. 269,
49:5-10; R. 271, 57:21-25.) This is not sufficient to create a genuine dispute that is
worthy of proceeding to trial.
Moreover, even if it is assumed that Pollan formally landscaped the Dirt
Road (which she did not), the temporary unsafe condition rule would still be the
applicable rule of law. See Hone, 2004 Utah App. LEXIS 174, at ** 3-4. And, as
outlined above, pursuant to that rule, liability cannot attach to Pollan because she
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had no notice of the indention in the Dirt Road. (See Part I B , supra.) As such,
this Court should conclude that this argument fails to provide any legitimate reason
to reverse the district court's correct conclusion that Pollan is entitled to summary
judgment.
In short, because the alleged unsafe conditions were both temporary
conditions of which Pollan had no notice, liability cannot attach to Pollan. Thus,
Lyman's arguments that summary judgment was not proper because she was a
business invitee and because Pollan had landscaped the Dirt Road provide no
legitimate reason to alter this conclusion. Accordingly, this Court should affirm
summary judgment in Pollan's favor.
II.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS ALSO WARRANTED BECAUSE
POLLAN HAD NO DUTY TO WARN LYMAN OF THE DIRT ROAD
AND ITS INHERENT NATURE BECAUSE IT SHOULD HAVE
BEEN KNOWN AND OBVIOUS TO LYMAN.
As discussed in Part I above, summary judgment was correctly granted in

this case on the ground that liability cannot attach to Pollan where there is no
evidence that she had knowledge of the alleged temporary unsafe conditions.
Alternatively, even if the Dirt Road is deemed a permanent hazardous condition of
which Pollan had notice (see Lyman's argument at Br. of Appellant, p. 4),
summary judgment is still warranted because Pollan owed no duty to warn Lyman
of the general condition of the Dirt Road (including the possibility of the purported
indention, the Dirt Road's composition, and its unevenness) where it should have
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been obvious and known to Lyman given the frequency with which Lyman
traversed the Dirt Road and because the unevenness and dirt and gravel
composition was inherent to the nature of the Dirt Road. For this reason, summary
judgment in Pollan's favor is also appropriate.
Under Utah law, "[w]hen an invitee is injured on a condition of land from
which the possessor did not owe a duty to protect the invitee, the possessor
commits no negligence." Hale, 2005 UT 24, at f 23. And, as a general matter, "[a]
possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused by an
activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless
the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness."
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 A(l); see Hale, 2004 UT 24, atfflf7-9, 14
(noting that section 3 43 A contains the duty of care that possessors of land in Utah
owe to invitees on their property). Moreover, "[reasonable care on the part of the
possessor . . . does not ordinarily require precautions, or even warnings, against
dangers that are known to the visitor or so obvious to him that he may be expected
to discover them." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 A cmt. e. Accordingly,
"under appropriate circumstances, a landowner's duty of care might not include
warning or otherwise protecting visitors from obvious dangers." Hale, 2004 UT
24, at f 23.
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Further, although Pollan has not found any Utah case addressing the issue, at
least one court has held that landowners are not obligated to prevent or warn of
conditions inherent in the nature of an unpaved roadway because they should be
anticipated by the person traversing the unpaved road, and are readily observable
by the use of the person's own senses. See DeLaurentis v. Marx Realty &
Improvement, 752 N.Y.S.2d 349, 350 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); Moriello v.
Stormville Airport Antique Show & Flea Market, Inc., 706 N.Y.S.2d 463, 464
(N.Y. App. Div. 2000). For example, in Moriello, the court upheld summary
judgment in defendant's favor on the ground that the defendant had no duty to
warn of the flat rock on an unpaved dirt road which caused plaintiff to fall because
the rock "was inherent in the nature of an unpaved roadway, and therefore should
have been anticipated by the plaintiff traversing the area." 706 N.Y.S.2d at 46465. Likewise, in DeLaurentis the court upheld summary judgment in the
defendant's favor on the ground that the "small rock or pebble over which plaintiff
fell was inherent in the nature of the dirt pathway, and the condition of the pathway
was known to the plaintiff such that the defendant had not breached any duty to
plaintiff by failing to warn the plaintiff of the pathway's condition. 752 N.Y.S.2d
at 350.
In the instant case, this Court should extend the law and hold that Pollan had
no duty to warn Lyman about the condition of the Dirt Road and the possible
33

Lyman would forget about the Dirt Road and its natural condition or fail to protect
herself against the possible dangers traversing the Dirt Road at night presented that
particular night.
Accordingly, this Court should conclude that Pollan had no duty to warn
Lyman about the Dirt Road and the potential dangers in traversing the Dirt Road at
night because the Dirt Road and its general uneven, gravel and dirt condition was
not only known and obvious to Lyman due to the number of times she observed
and traversed the Dirt Road, but was also inherent in the Dirt Road's nature.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Court should affirm the district court's grant
of summary judgment in Pollan's favor because liability cannot attach to Pollan
where Pollan did not have knowledge of the temporary hazardous conditions that
Lyman alleges caused her to suffer injury and liability should not attach to Pollan
where the uneven, dirt and gravel condition of the Dirt Road was known and
obvious to Lyman and also inherent in the Dirt Road's nature.
///
///

Based upon dicta in Hale v. Beckstrand, there may be an argument that under the
deliberate encounter exception Pollan may be liable despite the fact that the Dirt
Road and its condition were obvious and known to Lyman. See Hale, 2005 UT 24,
at ff 34-37. However, Lyman did not raise that argument in the trial court nor in
her opening brief to this Court, and therefore that argument has not been preserved.
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